We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one is for negative plurality games. The second one is for approval games under the condition that the number of candidates is equal to three. These results are combined with the analogous one obtained in De Sinopoli (Games Econ Behav 34:270–286, 2001) for plurality rule to show that, for generic utilities, three of the most well-known scoring rules, plurality, negative plurality and approval, induce finite sets of equilibrium outcomes in their corresponding derived games—at least when the number of candidates is equal to three. This is a necessary requirement for the development of a systematic comparison amongst these three voting rules and a useful aid to compute the stable sets of equilibria Mertens (Math Oper Res 14:575–625, 1989) of the induced voting games. To conclude, we provide some examples of voting environments with three candidates where we carry out this comparison.

De SInopoli, F., Iannantuoni, G., Pimienta, G. (2015). On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 44(4), 889-909 [10.1007/s00355-014-0866-z].

On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games

Iannantuoni, G
;
2015

Abstract

We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one is for negative plurality games. The second one is for approval games under the condition that the number of candidates is equal to three. These results are combined with the analogous one obtained in De Sinopoli (Games Econ Behav 34:270–286, 2001) for plurality rule to show that, for generic utilities, three of the most well-known scoring rules, plurality, negative plurality and approval, induce finite sets of equilibrium outcomes in their corresponding derived games—at least when the number of candidates is equal to three. This is a necessary requirement for the development of a systematic comparison amongst these three voting rules and a useful aid to compute the stable sets of equilibria Mertens (Math Oper Res 14:575–625, 1989) of the induced voting games. To conclude, we provide some examples of voting environments with three candidates where we carry out this comparison.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Game Theory, Voting Theory
English
2015
44
4
889
909
partially_open
De SInopoli, F., Iannantuoni, G., Pimienta, G. (2015). On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 44(4), 889-909 [10.1007/s00355-014-0866-z].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/220692
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