The Interpretation of the Charter of the Organization of American States by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

This article investigates the techniques employed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to interpret the Charter of the Organization of American States. The study highlights trends in interpreting constitutive treaties, such as emphasising the practice of the organizations and the effective performance of their functions, and contrasts them with the Court’s peculiar interpretative approach, which focuses on the pro persona principle and the notion of effectiveness. We argue that the Court generally overlooks the OAS Charter’s nature as a constitutive treaty, applying human rights interpretative techniques instead. When Charter provisions are not directly concerned with human rights, the Court seems to treat it as a generic international treaty, resorting to traditional rules of interpretation. We further contend that this practice is essentially uniform in advisory and contentious proceedings. Thus, the Court does not differentiate the weight of its interpretation according to the judicial function performed, despite varying jurisdictional bases.