False belief attribution in toddlers: an exploratory study with a novel unexpected-identity task

Introduction. Several studies, in the context of the debate on early implicit theory of mind, have investigated whether infants and toddlers are able to attribute false beliefs concerning the identity of an object. As a result, there is a lack of consensus regarding whether young children are able to understand others’ belief about an object’s identity when it can be represented in different ways. In the present study, we address this issue by using for the first time a close adaptation of a test originally devised by Butterfill and Apperly to advance the theoretical debate on early theory of mind. Given that this novel identity task could not be completed based on a minimal theory of mind, its use can play a significant role in such a debate. Method. Employing an eye tracking system and based on the violation-of-expectation-paradigm, we explored how the participants (50 toddlers aged 20–24 months) performed in the true belief condition and in the false belief condition on a new identity task with a dual-identity object. Results. Statistical analyses showed that the looking times and number of visits were not significantly higher in the TB condition than in the FB condition, supporting the claim that toddlers of this age don’t demonstrate an implicit understanding of false belief. Discussion. We discuss these outcomes in relation to the need for new studies operationalizing Butterfill and Apperly’s test in order to advance the theoretical debate on one-system vs. two-system accounts of early theory of mind.