We study the strategic behavior of voters in a spatial model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters' preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.

De Sinopoli, F., & Iannantuoni, G. (2008). Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 30(3), 401-417 [10.1007/s00355-007-0238-z].

Extreme voting under proportional representation: The multidimensional case

IANNANTUONI, GIOVANNA
2008

Abstract

We study the strategic behavior of voters in a spatial model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters' preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.
No
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Scientifica
strategic voting, proportional rule, Nash equilibrium
English
Copyright by Springer-Verlag. The original publication is available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/5535354764t7726l.
De Sinopoli, F., & Iannantuoni, G. (2008). Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 30(3), 401-417 [10.1007/s00355-007-0238-z].
De Sinopoli, F; Iannantuoni, G
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10281/5829
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