We study the strategic behavior of voters in a spatial model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters' preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.
De Sinopoli, F., Iannantuoni, G. (2008). Extreme voting under proportional representation: The multidimensional case. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 30(3), 401-417 [10.1007/s00355-007-0238-z].
Extreme voting under proportional representation: The multidimensional case
IANNANTUONI, GIOVANNA
2008
Abstract
We study the strategic behavior of voters in a spatial model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters' preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.
File in questo prodotto:
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
extreme.pdf
Solo gestori archivio
Tipologia di allegato:
Author’s Accepted Manuscript, AAM (Post-print)
Dimensione
330.4 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
330.4 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
