We investigate a class of parametric network games which encompasses both the cases of strategic complements and strategic substitutes. In the case of a bounded strategy space, we derive a representation formula for the unique Nash equilibrium. We also prove a comparison result between the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum and then compute the price of anarchy for some simple test problems
Passacantando, M., Raciti, F. (In corso di stampa). Some properties of a class of Network Games with strategic complements or substitutes. In T.M. Rassias, P.M. Pardalos (a cura di), Mathematical Analysis, Differential Equations and Applications (pp. 1-15). Singapore : World Scientific Publishing Company [10.1142/9789811267048_0023].
Some properties of a class of Network Games with strategic complements or substitutes
Passacantando, M;
In corso di stampa
Abstract
We investigate a class of parametric network games which encompasses both the cases of strategic complements and strategic substitutes. In the case of a bounded strategy space, we derive a representation formula for the unique Nash equilibrium. We also prove a comparison result between the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum and then compute the price of anarchy for some simple test problems
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Passacantando-2024-Math Analysis Diff Equations Appl-AAM.pdf
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