This essay aims to study constitutional conventions drawing on game theory. In fact, constitutional conventions produce rules to regulate strategic interactions between the various protagonists of institutional life. Game theory studies these strategic interactions in order to identify predicting patterns of future behaviours. Elements taken from game theory will demonstrate the close connection between these conventions and the principle of loyal cooperation between constitutional bodies. Thus, the deviation from a constitutional convention can be considered as a “symptom” of a violation of that principle.

Camerlengo, Q. (2022). Le convenzioni costituzionali tra principio di leale collaborazione e teoria dei giochi. CONSULTA ONLINE, 2022(1), 1-60.

Le convenzioni costituzionali tra principio di leale collaborazione e teoria dei giochi

Camerlengo, Q
2022

Abstract

This essay aims to study constitutional conventions drawing on game theory. In fact, constitutional conventions produce rules to regulate strategic interactions between the various protagonists of institutional life. Game theory studies these strategic interactions in order to identify predicting patterns of future behaviours. Elements taken from game theory will demonstrate the close connection between these conventions and the principle of loyal cooperation between constitutional bodies. Thus, the deviation from a constitutional convention can be considered as a “symptom” of a violation of that principle.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
costituzione; convenzioni; forma di governo; leale collaborazione; teoria dei giochi
Italian
1
60
60
Camerlengo, Q. (2022). Le convenzioni costituzionali tra principio di leale collaborazione e teoria dei giochi. CONSULTA ONLINE, 2022(1), 1-60.
Camerlengo, Q
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/393554
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