We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented depends not only on who is elected President but also on the composition of the Congress. We characterize the equilibria of the model using a conditional sincerity concept that takes into account the possibility that some voters may be simultaneously decisive in both elections. Such a concept emerges naturally in a model with trembles. A crucial feature of the solution is the moderation of Government. Our results are robust to several modifications of the model.

De Sinopoli, F., Ferraris, L., & Iannantuoni, G. (2015). Moderating Government. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 45(2), 415-440 [10.1007/s00355-015-0901-8].

Moderating Government

Ferraris, Leo;Iannantuoni, G
2015

Abstract

We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented depends not only on who is elected President but also on the composition of the Congress. We characterize the equilibria of the model using a conditional sincerity concept that takes into account the possibility that some voters may be simultaneously decisive in both elections. Such a concept emerges naturally in a model with trembles. A crucial feature of the solution is the moderation of Government. Our results are robust to several modifications of the model.
No
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Scientifica
Voting Theory, Electoral Systems
English
415
440
26
De Sinopoli, F., Ferraris, L., & Iannantuoni, G. (2015). Moderating Government. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 45(2), 415-440 [10.1007/s00355-015-0901-8].
De Sinopoli, F; Ferraris, L; Iannantuoni, G
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10281/220695
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