The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication—i.e. who is talking with whom—in a coordination game. We run an experiment in a three-player game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of players has a profitable joint deviation from the Pareto-superior equilibrium. We show that specific communication structures lead to different ‘coalition-proof’ equilibria in this game. Results match the theoretical predictions. Subjects communicate and play the Pareto-superior equilibrium when communication is public. When pairs of players exchange messages privately, subjects play the Pareto-inferior equilibrium. Even in these latter cases, however, players’ beliefs and choices tend to react to messages, despite the fact that these are not credible.

Grandjean, G., Mantovani, M., Mauleon, A., Vannetelbosch, V. (2017). Communication structure and coalition-proofness – Experimental evidence. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 94, 90-102 [10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.02.007].

Communication structure and coalition-proofness – Experimental evidence

Mantovani, Marco
;
2017

Abstract

The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication—i.e. who is talking with whom—in a coordination game. We run an experiment in a three-player game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of players has a profitable joint deviation from the Pareto-superior equilibrium. We show that specific communication structures lead to different ‘coalition-proof’ equilibria in this game. Results match the theoretical predictions. Subjects communicate and play the Pareto-superior equilibrium when communication is public. When pairs of players exchange messages privately, subjects play the Pareto-inferior equilibrium. Even in these latter cases, however, players’ beliefs and choices tend to react to messages, despite the fact that these are not credible.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Cheap-talk communication; Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium; Coordination; Laboratory experiment; Finance; Economics and Econometrics
English
2017
94
90
102
reserved
Grandjean, G., Mantovani, M., Mauleon, A., Vannetelbosch, V. (2017). Communication structure and coalition-proofness – Experimental evidence. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 94, 90-102 [10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.02.007].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/219122
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