The article deals with the ECJ Grunkin Paul judgment and addresses the many and relevant issues stemming out of such decision, while emphasizing its role as a relevant step towards full enjoyment of EU citizenship rights. Basing its decision on Article 18 EC, the Court assumes that the right to free circulation includes the right of all citizens to circulate with the same status they gained under one State (the so-called State of origin) and to maintain their personal identity throughout the entire European Union. In other words the right not to be forced by law to change one’s name should be recognized as inherent to the fundamental right to circulate within the EU. However, the existence of a right to free circulation of name is only one among many of the different issues arising from the Grunkin Paul decision. Another important point dealt with is the one on the law applicable to the name of EU citizens. Insofar the article examines the Advocate General position on the compatibility of the German conflict of laws rule with the principles of non-discrimination and free circulation and takes a critical view on the lack of response by the ECJ as to whether the national conflict of law rule is compatible with EU law. Further, the Grunkin Paul decision concerns the scope of application of the personal status rights. Even though the Court didn’t address the subject, it is maintained that the right to continuity of name, i.e. to personal identity, may also be extended to other features of personal status, or even to family status. Finally, one last highly sensitive issue addressed by the article concerns the determination of the State of origin. The author maintains that the judgment highlights the need for reviewing the theory according to which the State of origin is only the one of nationality, although the latter is reasonable from a standpoint of respecting the member States’ scopes of competence. In the end, given the Konstantinidis and Garcia Avello judgments, the Grunkin Paul decision constitutes another important step towards recognition of names in the European Union. Indeed by guaranteeing the free circulation of names this decision also contributes to reinforce and make more effective the free circulation of EU citizens.
Honorati, C. (2009). Free circulation of names for EU citizens?. IL DIRITTO DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA, 2009(3).
Free circulation of names for EU citizens?
HONORATI, COSTANZA
2009
Abstract
The article deals with the ECJ Grunkin Paul judgment and addresses the many and relevant issues stemming out of such decision, while emphasizing its role as a relevant step towards full enjoyment of EU citizenship rights. Basing its decision on Article 18 EC, the Court assumes that the right to free circulation includes the right of all citizens to circulate with the same status they gained under one State (the so-called State of origin) and to maintain their personal identity throughout the entire European Union. In other words the right not to be forced by law to change one’s name should be recognized as inherent to the fundamental right to circulate within the EU. However, the existence of a right to free circulation of name is only one among many of the different issues arising from the Grunkin Paul decision. Another important point dealt with is the one on the law applicable to the name of EU citizens. Insofar the article examines the Advocate General position on the compatibility of the German conflict of laws rule with the principles of non-discrimination and free circulation and takes a critical view on the lack of response by the ECJ as to whether the national conflict of law rule is compatible with EU law. Further, the Grunkin Paul decision concerns the scope of application of the personal status rights. Even though the Court didn’t address the subject, it is maintained that the right to continuity of name, i.e. to personal identity, may also be extended to other features of personal status, or even to family status. Finally, one last highly sensitive issue addressed by the article concerns the determination of the State of origin. The author maintains that the judgment highlights the need for reviewing the theory according to which the State of origin is only the one of nationality, although the latter is reasonable from a standpoint of respecting the member States’ scopes of competence. In the end, given the Konstantinidis and Garcia Avello judgments, the Grunkin Paul decision constitutes another important step towards recognition of names in the European Union. Indeed by guaranteeing the free circulation of names this decision also contributes to reinforce and make more effective the free circulation of EU citizens.
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