Several studies have stressed that, contrary to initial expectations, state-owned firms at the beginning of the transition undertook painful measures to adjust to the new economic environment. This paper investigates this behaviour in a simple game theoretic framework. It is argued that the massive amount of lay-offs created by state-owned firms during the initial phase of the transition can be interpreted as a signal directed to the banking sector in order to obtain more favourable financing conditions for the subsequent process of restructuring. The conclusions are strongly supported by Polish firm-level empirical evidence.
|Citazione:||Colombo, E. (2002). Restructuring as a Signal: a Simple Formalization. ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, 10(1), 119-142.|
|Tipo:||Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico|
|Carattere della pubblicazione:||Scientifica|
|Titolo:||Restructuring as a Signal: a Simple Formalization|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2002|
|Rivista:||ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su rivista|