Social contract theories are based on the idea of the “consent of the governed,” according to which norms, rules and institutions, constitutions in particular, must be based on the general consensus (or unanimous consent) of the individuals who are subject to the regulation. The article reports the results of an experiment aimed at identifying the conditions for the emergence of a self-enforcing social contract in the laboratory. Our main result is that spontaneous compliance with a non-self-interested norm of distribution is likely to occur if individuals have been part of the same process of ex ante agreement on the distributive norm under a ‘veil of ignorance,’ to which the emergence of reciprocal expectations of conformity is also related. This is in line with Rawls’s idea of an endogenous ‘sense of justice’ stabilizing ex post institutions that would have been ex ante chosen in the original position.

Faillo, M., Ottone, S., Sacconi, L. (2015). The social contract in the laboratory. An experimental analysis of self-enforcing impartial agreements. PUBLIC CHOICE, 163(3-4), 225-246 [10.1007/s11127-015-0246-y].

The social contract in the laboratory. An experimental analysis of self-enforcing impartial agreements

OTTONE, STEFANIA;
2015

Abstract

Social contract theories are based on the idea of the “consent of the governed,” according to which norms, rules and institutions, constitutions in particular, must be based on the general consensus (or unanimous consent) of the individuals who are subject to the regulation. The article reports the results of an experiment aimed at identifying the conditions for the emergence of a self-enforcing social contract in the laboratory. Our main result is that spontaneous compliance with a non-self-interested norm of distribution is likely to occur if individuals have been part of the same process of ex ante agreement on the distributive norm under a ‘veil of ignorance,’ to which the emergence of reciprocal expectations of conformity is also related. This is in line with Rawls’s idea of an endogenous ‘sense of justice’ stabilizing ex post institutions that would have been ex ante chosen in the original position.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Beliefs elicitation; Dictator games; Distributive justice; Social contract; Social norms;
English
2015
163
3-4
225
246
reserved
Faillo, M., Ottone, S., Sacconi, L. (2015). The social contract in the laboratory. An experimental analysis of self-enforcing impartial agreements. PUBLIC CHOICE, 163(3-4), 225-246 [10.1007/s11127-015-0246-y].
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Faillo2015_Article_TheSocialContractInTheLaborato.pdf

Solo gestori archivio

Tipologia di allegato: Publisher’s Version (Version of Record, VoR)
Dimensione 475.02 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
475.02 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/89611
Citazioni
  • Scopus 15
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 12
Social impact