This paper applies the tools of insurance economics to address the trade-off between commitment and flexibility arising in monetary policy. Monetary regimes are considered as alternative insurance policies designed to stabilize output. This approach provides a simple and straightforward reinterpretation of some seminal contributions to the literature on time inconsistency--such as the desirability of monetary policy delegation to an independent conservative central banker--and it accounts for some novel results deriving from informational asymmetries about the central banker's degree of conservatism. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester

Tirelli, P., Natale, P., & Lossani, M. (1998). Monetary Regimes as Insurance Schemes. Old Wine in New Bottles?. MANCHESTER SCHOOL, 66(5), 550-570 [10.1111/1467-9957.00124].

Monetary Regimes as Insurance Schemes. Old Wine in New Bottles?

Tirelli, P;Natale, P;
1998

Abstract

This paper applies the tools of insurance economics to address the trade-off between commitment and flexibility arising in monetary policy. Monetary regimes are considered as alternative insurance policies designed to stabilize output. This approach provides a simple and straightforward reinterpretation of some seminal contributions to the literature on time inconsistency--such as the desirability of monetary policy delegation to an independent conservative central banker--and it accounts for some novel results deriving from informational asymmetries about the central banker's degree of conservatism. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester
No
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Scientifica
Monetary Regimes
English
550
570
21
Tirelli, P., Natale, P., & Lossani, M. (1998). Monetary Regimes as Insurance Schemes. Old Wine in New Bottles?. MANCHESTER SCHOOL, 66(5), 550-570 [10.1111/1467-9957.00124].
Tirelli, P; Natale, P; Lossani, M
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10281/8753
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