Time inconsistency in monetary policy can be addressed appointing a conservative central banker. But incomplete information about the central banker's preferences impairs the performance of delegation schemes. Firstly, the ensuing ex ante variability of monetary response lowers welfare. Secondly, partial independence schemes may prove inadequate because reputation--not only legal arrangements--defines the actual degree of independence. The incumbent may exploit his reputation to impose too conservative policies, whereas if he lacks reputation, partial independence forces him to accommodate. As a result, simple rules may be preferred

Tirelli, P., Natale, P., Lossani, M. (1998). Incomplete Information in Monetary Policy Games: Rules Rather Than a Conservative Central Banker. SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 45(1), 33-47 [10.1111/1467-9485.00080].

Incomplete Information in Monetary Policy Games: Rules Rather Than a Conservative Central Banker

Tirelli, P;Natale, P;
1998

Abstract

Time inconsistency in monetary policy can be addressed appointing a conservative central banker. But incomplete information about the central banker's preferences impairs the performance of delegation schemes. Firstly, the ensuing ex ante variability of monetary response lowers welfare. Secondly, partial independence schemes may prove inadequate because reputation--not only legal arrangements--defines the actual degree of independence. The incumbent may exploit his reputation to impose too conservative policies, whereas if he lacks reputation, partial independence forces him to accommodate. As a result, simple rules may be preferred
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Rules Rather Than a Conservative Central Banker
English
1998
45
1
33
47
none
Tirelli, P., Natale, P., Lossani, M. (1998). Incomplete Information in Monetary Policy Games: Rules Rather Than a Conservative Central Banker. SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 45(1), 33-47 [10.1111/1467-9485.00080].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/8750
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