Several studies show that evolution favors non-selfish preferences only if preference types are observable. We present a new evolutionary scenario applied to the Centipede Game, where we adopt self-confirming equilibrium to capture behavior. We show that altruism may be evolutionarily successful even if preferences are unobservable.
Gamba, A. (2013). Learning and evolution of altruistic preferences in the Centipede game. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 85, 112-117 [10.1016/j.jebo.2012.11.009].
Learning and evolution of altruistic preferences in the Centipede game
Gamba, A
2013
Abstract
Several studies show that evolution favors non-selfish preferences only if preference types are observable. We present a new evolutionary scenario applied to the Centipede Game, where we adopt self-confirming equilibrium to capture behavior. We show that altruism may be evolutionarily successful even if preferences are unobservable.
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