Structures and safeguards of independence of research evaluation agencies: a comparative study

ANVUR (the National Agency for the Evaluation of Universities and Research) appears, in light of the recent reform introduced by Presidential Decree No. 12/2026, to have been drawn into the orbit of the Executive, as the regulation has granted the competent Minister the power to appoint directly the President of the Agency and, indirectly, the members of its Governing Board. Beyond the critical issues identifiable at the organizational level, the decree also raises significant concerns from a functional perspective, insofar as it has conferred upon the Minister a concurrent procedural initiative power with regard to ANVUR’s core competences. The 2026 reform thus seems to have affected the Agency’s neutrality, curtailing its autonomy and undermining the minimum safeguards of independence originally provided for in its founding statute. In light of the Italian experience, this study aims to examine, from a comparative perspective and through an analysis of the German, French, and Spanish legal systems, the degree of independence enjoyed by agencies or other bodies responsible for research evaluation. The objective is to ascertain whether, within the broader European context, the evaluation function is in some measure subordinated to political direction, or whether it remains genuinely autonomous and insulated from forms of influence exercised by national executives. The study is particularly relevant insofar as an excessively “centralized” system of evaluation may foster not only opportunistic behavior but also ideologically driven dynamics, with potentially detrimental effects on academic freedom and the autonomy of research.