We model an international union as a group of countries deciding to centralize the provision of public goods, or policies, that generate externalities across union members. The trade-off between the benefits of coordination and the loss of independent policymaking endogenously determines size, composition, and scope of the union. Policy uniformity reduces the size of the union, may block the entry of new members, and induces excessive centralization. We study flexible rules with nonuniform policies that reduce these inefficiencies, focusing particularly on arrangements that are relevant to the ongoing debate on the institutional structure Of the European Union

Alesina, A., Angeloni, A., & Etro, F. (2005). International unions. THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 95(3), 602-615 [10.1257/0002828054201279].

International unions

ETRO, FEDERICO
2005

Abstract

We model an international union as a group of countries deciding to centralize the provision of public goods, or policies, that generate externalities across union members. The trade-off between the benefits of coordination and the loss of independent policymaking endogenously determines size, composition, and scope of the union. Policy uniformity reduces the size of the union, may block the entry of new members, and induces excessive centralization. We study flexible rules with nonuniform policies that reduce these inefficiencies, focusing particularly on arrangements that are relevant to the ongoing debate on the institutional structure Of the European Union
Si
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Scientifica
Unions, European Union
English
Alesina, A., Angeloni, A., & Etro, F. (2005). International unions. THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 95(3), 602-615 [10.1257/0002828054201279].
Alesina, A; Angeloni, A; Etro, F
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10281/6140
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