This article presents a Schumpeterian model where the engine of growth is in the microeconomic structure of the patent races. Under decreasing marginal productivity and endogenous entry in the R&D sector, the equilibrium is characterized by small firms investing too little and the growth process is dynamically inefficient; the optimal policy for innovation always implies R&D subsidies. When the incumbent monopolists are leaders in patent races with endogenous entry, they engage in larger R&D investment and their persistent leadership enhances growth. In a multicountry setup, growth is driven by innovations in the largest country and increases with its relative size and openness. Finally, I derive the optimal R&D subsidy from the point of view of a single country, and provide a new case for international coordination of R&D policies.
Etro, F. (2008). Growth leaders. JOURNAL OF MACROECONOMICS, 30(3), 1148-1172.
Citazione: | Etro, F. (2008). Growth leaders. JOURNAL OF MACROECONOMICS, 30(3), 1148-1172. |
Tipo: | Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico |
Carattere della pubblicazione: | Scientifica |
Titolo: | Growth leaders |
Autori: | Etro, F |
Autori: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2008 |
Lingua: | English |
Rivista: | JOURNAL OF MACROECONOMICS |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2007.04.003 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 01 - Articolo su rivista |