In a coordination game with multiple Pareto ordered equilibria and population uncertainty, we show that group size helps select a unique equilibrium, for reasons reminiscent of the global games literature. A critical mass phenomenon emerges at equilibrium. Group size has an emboldening effect on participants.
De Sinopoli, F., Ferraris, L., Meroni, C. (2026). Group size as selection device. ECONOMIC THEORY, 82(2), 717-739 [10.1007/s00199-026-01714-3].
Group size as selection device
Ferraris L.;
2026
Abstract
In a coordination game with multiple Pareto ordered equilibria and population uncertainty, we show that group size helps select a unique equilibrium, for reasons reminiscent of the global games literature. A critical mass phenomenon emerges at equilibrium. Group size has an emboldening effect on participants.
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