Understanding the evolutionary origins of altruistic punishment, a critical mechanism sustaining cooperation, remains a central challenge in behavioural science. Voluntary participation is considered a powerful approach that enables its emergence, but its explanatory power typically rests on the common assumption that non-participants have no impact on the public good. Yet, given the decentralized nature of voluntary participation, opting out does not necessarily preclude individuals from influencing the public good. Here, we revisit the role of voluntary participation by allowing non-participants to exert either positive or negative impacts on the public good. Using evolutionary analysis in a well-mixed finite population, we find that positive externalities from non-participants lower the synergy threshold required for altruistic punishment to dominate. In contrast, negative externalities raise this threshold, making altruistic punishment harder to sustain. Notably, when non-participants have positive impacts, altruistic punishment thrives only if non-participation is incentivized, whereas under negative impacts, it can persist even when non-participation is discouraged. Our findings reveal that efforts to promote altruistic punishment must account for the active role of non-participants, whose influence can make or break collective outcomes.

Song, Z., Shen, C., Capraro, V., Han, T. (2026). Non-participant externalities reshape the evolution of altruistic punishment. JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY INTERFACE, 23(235), 1-13 [10.1098/rsif.2025.0820].

Non-participant externalities reshape the evolution of altruistic punishment

Capraro V.;
2026

Abstract

Understanding the evolutionary origins of altruistic punishment, a critical mechanism sustaining cooperation, remains a central challenge in behavioural science. Voluntary participation is considered a powerful approach that enables its emergence, but its explanatory power typically rests on the common assumption that non-participants have no impact on the public good. Yet, given the decentralized nature of voluntary participation, opting out does not necessarily preclude individuals from influencing the public good. Here, we revisit the role of voluntary participation by allowing non-participants to exert either positive or negative impacts on the public good. Using evolutionary analysis in a well-mixed finite population, we find that positive externalities from non-participants lower the synergy threshold required for altruistic punishment to dominate. In contrast, negative externalities raise this threshold, making altruistic punishment harder to sustain. Notably, when non-participants have positive impacts, altruistic punishment thrives only if non-participation is incentivized, whereas under negative impacts, it can persist even when non-participation is discouraged. Our findings reveal that efforts to promote altruistic punishment must account for the active role of non-participants, whose influence can make or break collective outcomes.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
altruistic punishment; cooperation; evolutionary game theory; population dynamics; public goods game; voluntary participation;
English
18-feb-2026
2026
23
235
1
13
20250820
open
Song, Z., Shen, C., Capraro, V., Han, T. (2026). Non-participant externalities reshape the evolution of altruistic punishment. JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY INTERFACE, 23(235), 1-13 [10.1098/rsif.2025.0820].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/608342
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