Opacity in the Italian decision-making process : Lobbying and its lack of legal framework

In the Italian legal system, traditionally based on the prominence of the public interest, there has been a tendency to attribute a growing relevance to the interests of individuals. Therefore, nowadays it is necessary to reach a balance between the latter and the public interest, which has to be fulfilled by both administrative and political activity. In this context, it is possible to analyze the phenomenon of lobbying, taking into account the close correlation - initially understood, rather, as a clear contrast - between public interest and lobbying activities. Although such correlation should have resulted in a deepening understanding by administrative law, in Italy the phenomenon of lobbies has remained in a grey area and has not been investigated in-depth by administrative law doctrine. In fact, the historically disadvantage of these interest groups has led to the absence of a legal framework, leaving lobbying outside the legal world and, so, allowing that the influence of interest groups could lead to corruption, subject to criminal sanctions. After outlining the strict relationship between public interest and interest groups, the paper means to investigate the need to introduce a regulation of lobbying in Italian law and to understand whether or not the regulations adopted by some Italian authorities could be a first stone in the drafting of a legal regime.