In this chapter, we further investigate a previous game theoretical model of social and economic interactions where players are considered according to their position in a social network and also to their geographic location. Our model allows for intermediate geographic areas, between the city center and the periphery. Moreover, an analysis of some simple but paradigmatic networks shows that the game whose solution yields the players’ location can have multiple equilibria.
Passacantando, M., Raciti, F., Rassias, M. (2025). A two-stage game theoretical model of social interactions and location choice in city areas. In P.M. Pardalos, T.M. Rassias (a cura di), Mathematical Analysis, Optimization, Approximation and Applications (pp. 753-772). World Scientific [10.1142/9789811293009_0033].
A two-stage game theoretical model of social interactions and location choice in city areas
Passacantando, M;
2025
Abstract
In this chapter, we further investigate a previous game theoretical model of social and economic interactions where players are considered according to their position in a social network and also to their geographic location. Our model allows for intermediate geographic areas, between the city center and the periphery. Moreover, an analysis of some simple but paradigmatic networks shows that the game whose solution yields the players’ location can have multiple equilibria.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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