According to Duncker, “A problem arises when a living creature has a goal but does not know how this goal is to be reached. Whenever one cannot go from the given situation to the desired situation simply by action, then there has to be recourse to thinking.” Given that any situation involving thought processes can be considered a problem, solving or attempting to solve problems is a typical and, hence, general function of thought. Studying insight problems in particular requires reconsidering the concept of bounded rationality. Simon’s work has inspired us to reflect on the specific quality of the type of cognitive boundaries which, by limiting search, foster the act of creativity. Finding the solution to insight problems provides a paradigmatic case of this creativity. Following this perspective, we believe that the solution to these problems is attained not by abstraction but by a relevant interpretation of the context (interpretative heuristic) with respect to the goal, which allows the problem solver to abandon the default representation. Such a process reveals the intimate connection between language and thought. However, reasoning as characterized by Wason’s confirmation bias or by Kahneman and Tversky’s cognitive illusions contrasts starkly with Duncker and Simon’s description of reasoning, where people challenge the limits of their cognitive system with a certain degree of success. In this chapter, we seek to explain this paradoxical enigma of thought.

Macchi, L., Bagassi, M. (2024). Problem solving, bounded rationality and the enigma of thought. In G. Gigerenzer, S. Mousavi, R. Viale (a cura di), Elgar Companion to Herbert Simon (pp. 228-246). Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. [10.4337/9781800370685.00021].

Problem solving, bounded rationality and the enigma of thought

Macchi L.
;
Bagassi M.
2024

Abstract

According to Duncker, “A problem arises when a living creature has a goal but does not know how this goal is to be reached. Whenever one cannot go from the given situation to the desired situation simply by action, then there has to be recourse to thinking.” Given that any situation involving thought processes can be considered a problem, solving or attempting to solve problems is a typical and, hence, general function of thought. Studying insight problems in particular requires reconsidering the concept of bounded rationality. Simon’s work has inspired us to reflect on the specific quality of the type of cognitive boundaries which, by limiting search, foster the act of creativity. Finding the solution to insight problems provides a paradigmatic case of this creativity. Following this perspective, we believe that the solution to these problems is attained not by abstraction but by a relevant interpretation of the context (interpretative heuristic) with respect to the goal, which allows the problem solver to abandon the default representation. Such a process reveals the intimate connection between language and thought. However, reasoning as characterized by Wason’s confirmation bias or by Kahneman and Tversky’s cognitive illusions contrasts starkly with Duncker and Simon’s description of reasoning, where people challenge the limits of their cognitive system with a certain degree of success. In this chapter, we seek to explain this paradoxical enigma of thought.
Capitolo o saggio
Bounded rationality; Insight, Restructuring, Problem solving, Interpretative heuristic, Unconscious analytic thought
English
Elgar Companion to Herbert Simon
Gigerenzer, G; Mousavi, S; Viale, R;
2024
9781800370678
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
228
246
Macchi, L., Bagassi, M. (2024). Problem solving, bounded rationality and the enigma of thought. In G. Gigerenzer, S. Mousavi, R. Viale (a cura di), Elgar Companion to Herbert Simon (pp. 228-246). Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. [10.4337/9781800370685.00021].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/525942
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