The survey is focused on the typical problems in information transmission from experts to non-experts. Attention is paid to the factors that can affect information disclosure in models that apply a game-theoretic approach to the use of professional advice. In the economic literature expertise is mainly analyzed as a special case of asymmetric information between expert and non-expert. The contributions are reviewed according to a double criterion, that takes into account both the preferences of the experts and the properties of communication. On one side, either the non-expert plays the role of a decision-maker, who chooses an action that is payoff-relevant for the expert, or the preferences of the expert directly depend on some measure of his reputation as a high-ability forecaster. On the other side, communication can range from pure cheap talk to completely verifiable messages. © 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
Valsecchi, I.A. (2013). The expert Problem: a Survey. ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE, 14, 303-331.
Citazione: | Valsecchi, I.A. (2013). The expert Problem: a Survey. ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE, 14, 303-331. |
Tipo: | Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico |
Carattere della pubblicazione: | Scientifica |
Presenza di un coautore afferente ad Istituzioni straniere: | No |
Titolo: | The expert Problem: a Survey |
Autori: | Valsecchi, IA |
Autori: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2013 |
Lingua: | English |
Rivista: | ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10101-013-0129-y |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 01 - Articolo su rivista |