The survey is focused on the typical problems in information transmission from experts to non-experts. Attention is paid to the factors that can affect information disclosure in models that apply a game-theoretic approach to the use of professional advice. In the economic literature expertise is mainly analyzed as a special case of asymmetric information between expert and non-expert. The contributions are reviewed according to a double criterion, that takes into account both the preferences of the experts and the properties of communication. On one side, either the non-expert plays the role of a decision-maker, who chooses an action that is payoff-relevant for the expert, or the preferences of the expert directly depend on some measure of his reputation as a high-ability forecaster. On the other side, communication can range from pure cheap talk to completely verifiable messages. © 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
Valsecchi, I.A. (2013). The expert Problem: a Survey. ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE, 14, 303-331 [10.1007/s10101-013-0129-y].
|Citazione:||Valsecchi, I.A. (2013). The expert Problem: a Survey. ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE, 14, 303-331 [10.1007/s10101-013-0129-y].|
|Tipo:||Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico|
|Carattere della pubblicazione:||Scientifica|
|Presenza di un coautore afferente ad Istituzioni straniere:||No|
|Titolo:||The expert Problem: a Survey|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2013|
|Rivista:||ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10101-013-0129-y|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||01 - Articolo su rivista|