There is no consensus in whether monetary losses make individuals more generous or selfish. Utilizing a dictator game (DG), we study the impact of loss framing on altruism and find that dictators’ altruism is sensitive to the loss frame they are embedded in. In a DG in which the dictators share a loss between themselves and a recipient, the monetary allocations are more benevolent than in a setting without a loss and in a DG in which the dictators share what remains of their endowments after a loss. These differences are explained by the social norms the loss frames invoke.

Antinyan, A., Corazzini, L., Fisar, M., Reggiani, T. (2024). Mind the framing when studying social preferences in the domain of losses. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 218(February 2024), 599-612 [10.1016/j.jebo.2023.12.024].

Mind the framing when studying social preferences in the domain of losses

Corazzini, L;
2024

Abstract

There is no consensus in whether monetary losses make individuals more generous or selfish. Utilizing a dictator game (DG), we study the impact of loss framing on altruism and find that dictators’ altruism is sensitive to the loss frame they are embedded in. In a DG in which the dictators share a loss between themselves and a recipient, the monetary allocations are more benevolent than in a setting without a loss and in a DG in which the dictators share what remains of their endowments after a loss. These differences are explained by the social norms the loss frames invoke.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Altruism; Dictator game; Experiment; Framing; Loss; Social norms;
English
12-gen-2024
2024
218
February 2024
599
612
reserved
Antinyan, A., Corazzini, L., Fisar, M., Reggiani, T. (2024). Mind the framing when studying social preferences in the domain of losses. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 218(February 2024), 599-612 [10.1016/j.jebo.2023.12.024].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/470558
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