In this paper we estimate a model where inflation, a measure of de facto central bank independence and an index of de facto exchange rate regime are simultaneously determined by a set of economic, political and institutional variables. De facto central bank independence is hampered by socio-political turbulence and benefits from the balance of powers between the executive and the parliament. Inflation is explained by de facto central bank independence, by the level and volatility of public expenditure and by the de facto exchange rate regime. Openness (real and financial) affects inflation through the exchange rate regime channel. Success in controlling inflation, in turn is crucial to sustain central bank independence and exchange rate stability.
Carmignani, F., Colombo, E., & Tirelli, P. (2008). Socio-political and economic determinants of de facto monetary institutions and inflationary outcomes. THE B.E. JOURNAL OF MACROECONOMICS, 8(11).
Citazione: | Carmignani, F., Colombo, E., & Tirelli, P. (2008). Socio-political and economic determinants of de facto monetary institutions and inflationary outcomes. THE B.E. JOURNAL OF MACROECONOMICS, 8(11). |
Tipo: | Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico |
Carattere della pubblicazione: | Scientifica |
Titolo: | Socio-political and economic determinants of de facto monetary institutions and inflationary outcomes |
Autori: | Carmignani, F; Colombo, E; Tirelli, P |
Autori: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | nov-2008 |
Lingua: | English |
Rivista: | THE B.E. JOURNAL OF MACROECONOMICS |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1935-1690.1591 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 01 - Articolo su rivista |