Election cycles in mining licensing: theory and evidence from Albania

Most of the literature on political business and budgetary cycles (PBBC) has focused on fiscal and monetary policy variables in advanced-country contexts. We extend this literature by investigating political cycle effects in a non-monetary, non-fiscal policy regime (the allocation of mining licences) in a transition country context. We propose a model of mining licensing that allows for corruption and for both supply and demand effects to determine the outcome. We then estimate this model using time-series data from post-communist Albania. Relying on a dynamic Poisson model, we find evidence of both opportunistic and partisan effects. Based on our theory, we suggest a corruption interpretation of political cycles in non-fiscal/non-monetary variables. This interpretation, we suggest, may be more applicable to the context of developing and transition countries. Our study raises important questions about the unintended (and often pernicious) effects of transition politics on economic regulation and economic performance in post-socialist economies.