We present a simple voting environment with three candidates where the Condorcet winner exists. Under plurality rule, the derived game has a stable set where such a candidate is elected with probability one. However, no stable set of the approval game elects the Condorcet winner with positive probability. We also analyze the robustness of such an example to changes in the number of voters and their preferences. To conclude, we present a generic four-candidate voting environment with the same properties.

We present a simple voting environment with three candidates where the Condorcet winner exists. Under plurality rule, the derived game has a stable set where such a candidate is elected with probability one. However, no stable set of the approval game elects the Condorcet winner with positive probability. We also analyze the robustness of such an example to changes in the number of voters and their preferences. To conclude, we present a generic four-candidate voting environment with the same properties

De Sinopoli, F., Iannantuoni, G., Pimienta, C. (2014). Counterexamples on the superiority of approval versus plurality. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, 16(5), 824-834 [10.1111/jpet.12080].

Counterexamples on the superiority of approval versus plurality

IANNANTUONI, GIOVANNA;
2014

Abstract

We present a simple voting environment with three candidates where the Condorcet winner exists. Under plurality rule, the derived game has a stable set where such a candidate is elected with probability one. However, no stable set of the approval game elects the Condorcet winner with positive probability. We also analyze the robustness of such an example to changes in the number of voters and their preferences. To conclude, we present a generic four-candidate voting environment with the same properties
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Plurality Rule, Approval Rule
English
2014
16
5
824
834
reserved
De Sinopoli, F., Iannantuoni, G., Pimienta, C. (2014). Counterexamples on the superiority of approval versus plurality. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, 16(5), 824-834 [10.1111/jpet.12080].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/44474
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