This paper deals with the problem of specifying a general learning model, the rationality of which is not situation dependent. I propose a very general model of adaptive learning suitable to study learning problems in games with imperfect monitoring, such as extensive form games. In this context I relate adaptive learning with a general notion of equilibrium. In particular I provide a dynamic characterisation of conjectural equilibria: a "stable" strategy profile is consistent with adaptive learning if and only if it is a conjectural equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D83, D82
Gilli, M. (1999). Adaptive Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS, 2(2), 472-485 [10.1006/redy.1998.0047].
Citazione: | Gilli, M. (1999). Adaptive Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS, 2(2), 472-485 [10.1006/redy.1998.0047]. | |
Tipo: | Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico | |
Carattere della pubblicazione: | Scientifica | |
Presenza di un coautore afferente ad Istituzioni straniere: | No | |
Titolo: | Adaptive Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games | |
Autori: | Gilli, M | |
Autori: | ||
Data di pubblicazione: | 1999 | |
Lingua: | English | |
Rivista: | REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS | |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/redy.1998.0047 | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 01 - Articolo su rivista |