This paper deals with the problem of specifying a general learning model, the rationality of which is not situation dependent. I propose a very general model of adaptive learning suitable to study learning problems in games with imperfect monitoring, such as extensive form games. In this context I relate adaptive learning with a general notion of equilibrium. In particular I provide a dynamic characterisation of conjectural equilibria: a "stable" strategy profile is consistent with adaptive learning if and only if it is a conjectural equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D83, D82

Gilli, M. (1999). Adaptive Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS, 2(2), 472-485 [10.1006/redy.1998.0047].

Adaptive Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games

Gilli, MR
1999

Abstract

This paper deals with the problem of specifying a general learning model, the rationality of which is not situation dependent. I propose a very general model of adaptive learning suitable to study learning problems in games with imperfect monitoring, such as extensive form games. In this context I relate adaptive learning with a general notion of equilibrium. In particular I provide a dynamic characterisation of conjectural equilibria: a "stable" strategy profile is consistent with adaptive learning if and only if it is a conjectural equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D83, D82
No
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Scientifica
adaptive learning; justification operator; imperfect monitoring games
teoria dei giochi, apprendimento, informazione
English
472
485
14
Gilli, M. (1999). Adaptive Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS, 2(2), 472-485 [10.1006/redy.1998.0047].
Gilli, M
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10281/4404
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