This paper deals with the problem of specifying a general learning model, the rationality of which is not situation dependent. I propose a very general model of adaptive learning suitable to study learning problems in games with imperfect monitoring, such as extensive form games. In this context I relate adaptive learning with a general notion of equilibrium. In particular I provide a dynamic characterisation of conjectural equilibria: a "stable" strategy profile is consistent with adaptive learning if and only if it is a conjectural equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D83, D82
Gilli, M. (1999). Adaptive Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS, 2(2), 472-485 [10.1006/redy.1998.0047].
Adaptive Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games
Gilli, MR
1999
Abstract
This paper deals with the problem of specifying a general learning model, the rationality of which is not situation dependent. I propose a very general model of adaptive learning suitable to study learning problems in games with imperfect monitoring, such as extensive form games. In this context I relate adaptive learning with a general notion of equilibrium. In particular I provide a dynamic characterisation of conjectural equilibria: a "stable" strategy profile is consistent with adaptive learning if and only if it is a conjectural equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D83, D82
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