I consider generalisations of the Nash equilibrium concept based on the idea that in equilibrium the players' beliefs should not be contradicted, even if they could possibly be incorrect. This possibility depends on the information about opponents' behaviour available to the players in equilibrium. Therefore the players' information is crucial for this notion of equilibrium, called Conjectural Equilibrium in general and Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium (Rubinstein-Wolinsky 1994) when the game and the players' Bayesian rationality are common knowledge. In this paper I argue for a refinement of Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium showing by propositions and by examples how this equilibrium notion works and how the suitable equilibrium concept depends on the players' information.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D83, D82. © 1999 Academic Press.

Gilli, M. (1999). On non-nash equilibria. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 27(2), 184-203 [10.1006/game.1998.0664].

On non-nash equilibria

GILLI, MARIO ROBERTO
1999

Abstract

I consider generalisations of the Nash equilibrium concept based on the idea that in equilibrium the players' beliefs should not be contradicted, even if they could possibly be incorrect. This possibility depends on the information about opponents' behaviour available to the players in equilibrium. Therefore the players' information is crucial for this notion of equilibrium, called Conjectural Equilibrium in general and Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium (Rubinstein-Wolinsky 1994) when the game and the players' Bayesian rationality are common knowledge. In this paper I argue for a refinement of Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium showing by propositions and by examples how this equilibrium notion works and how the suitable equilibrium concept depends on the players' information.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D83, D82. © 1999 Academic Press.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
teoria dei giochi, equilibrio, informazione
English
1999
27
2
184
203
none
Gilli, M. (1999). On non-nash equilibria. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 27(2), 184-203 [10.1006/game.1998.0664].
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/4403
Citazioni
  • Scopus 15
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 13
Social impact