We study the role of social preferences and conformity in explaining herding behavior in anonymous risky environments. In an experiment similar to information cascade settings, but with no private information, we find no evidence for conformity. On the contrary, we observe a significant amount of non-conforming behavior, which cannot be attributed to errors.
Corazzini, L., Greiner, B. (2007). Herding, social preferences and (non-)conformity. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 97(1), 74-80 [10.1016/j.econlet.2007.02.024].
Herding, social preferences and (non-)conformity
Corazzini, L;
2007
Abstract
We study the role of social preferences and conformity in explaining herding behavior in anonymous risky environments. In an experiment similar to information cascade settings, but with no private information, we find no evidence for conformity. On the contrary, we observe a significant amount of non-conforming behavior, which cannot be attributed to errors.File in questo prodotto:
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