When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk mis-coordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. To study this, we extend a threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a series of experiments, we show that the presence of an intermediary increases public good success and subjects’ earnings only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary has a negative impact, complicating the donation environment, decreasing contributions and public good success.

Corazzini, L., Cotton, C., Reggiani, T. (2020). Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 23(4), 1030-1068 [10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6].

Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence

Luca Corazzini;
2020

Abstract

When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk mis-coordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. To study this, we extend a threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a series of experiments, we show that the presence of an intermediary increases public good success and subjects’ earnings only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary has a negative impact, complicating the donation environment, decreasing contributions and public good success.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Delegation; Fundraising; Laboratory experiment; Threshold public goods;
English
18-dic-2019
2020
23
4
1030
1068
reserved
Corazzini, L., Cotton, C., Reggiani, T. (2020). Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 23(4), 1030-1068 [10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/437499
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