This paper studies the issue of constitutional design, and supermajorities in particular, from a behavioral economics perspective. The relevant parameters are voting power, risk aversion, and pessimism. Voters who feel powerful prefer lower thresholds, while risk averters and those who feel pessimistic about the majority prefer higher thresholds. We also analyze the effects of loss aversion and overconfidence. The former leads voters to prefer more protective voting rules, a manifestation of their bias towards the status quo. The latter leads them to prefer overly low (high) protection when they receive good (bad) news about how others will vote. Finally, we study constitutional agreements on the voting rule. Members of the constituent assembly are heterogeneous in the parameters above. Weak and minority members anticipate high expropriation risk in future decisions. This gives them consistent leverage to push for a protective constitution.

Attanasi, G., Corazzini, L., Passarelli, F. (2017). Voting as a Lottery. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 146(146), 129-137 [10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.11.016].

Voting as a Lottery

Corazzini, L;
2017

Abstract

This paper studies the issue of constitutional design, and supermajorities in particular, from a behavioral economics perspective. The relevant parameters are voting power, risk aversion, and pessimism. Voters who feel powerful prefer lower thresholds, while risk averters and those who feel pessimistic about the majority prefer higher thresholds. We also analyze the effects of loss aversion and overconfidence. The former leads voters to prefer more protective voting rules, a manifestation of their bias towards the status quo. The latter leads them to prefer overly low (high) protection when they receive good (bad) news about how others will vote. Finally, we study constitutional agreements on the voting rule. Members of the constituent assembly are heterogeneous in the parameters above. Weak and minority members anticipate high expropriation risk in future decisions. This gives them consistent leverage to push for a protective constitution.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Supermajority; Weighted votes; Loss aversion; Overconfidence; Behavioral political economy; Constitutions
English
2017
146
146
129
137
reserved
Attanasi, G., Corazzini, L., Passarelli, F. (2017). Voting as a Lottery. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 146(146), 129-137 [10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.11.016].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/437484
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