Can machines be murdered?

This paper examines the hypothesis that deactivating a suitably powerful computer system could, theoretically, constitute murder. This paper is divided in to two sections. Section I outlines a case for the possibility of a genuine synthetic consciousness. Initially it is established that, given the Closure of Physics and Unity of Nature, the human mind should be seen as an ultimately physical entity- in a sense identical to the brain. Since all mental events (including conscious experiences) must therefore be realised by physical events in the brain, it follows that if the physical events are replicated in a synthetic brain, a synthetic mind and consciousness will result. Some possible objections to the possibility of conscious machines will be considered. Section II progresses from this, positing that the existence of consciousness is the only criterion by which a being can be judged to have a right to life. This is in agreement with the argument suggesting that continuity of consciousness is the measure which ensures a person has the same rights throughout time. If this is the case, it must therefore be accepted that this consciousness is stand-alone and that its genesis is irrelevant to its moral status. It follows from this that a being possessing synthetic consciousness would have the same rights as a being possessing a natural consciousness. This leads to the conclusion that deactivating such a machine would qualify as murder, a scenario which might become relevant in the not so distant future.