Neuroscientific and philosophical theories of the mind-body problem in neuropsychiatry

Background: The practice of clinical neuropsychiatry relies, often implicitly, on fundamental assumptions about how brain function affects mental states and behavior. This modern formulation of the mind-body problem has been the focus of sophisticated theoretical work and has far-reaching implications for the understanding and management of neuropsychiatric conditions. Objective: This review aimed to identify and analyze the most influential theories on the mind-body problem from both neuroscientific and philosophical perspectives. Methods: A systematic literature review was conducted across the Medline, EMBASE and PsycINFO databases, as well as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and David Chalmers’ MindPapers online bibliography, focusing on theoretical articles on the relationship between mind and brain and the mind-body problem. Results: Although most neuroscientific models have been developed in recent years based on our understanding of brain function (e.g. “global workspace theory” and “integrated information theory”), traditional philosophical constructs formulated centuries ago persist in modern-day neuropsychiatric narratives (e.g. Cartesian dualism). Overall, neuroscience-based theories converge on materialism or physicalism, whereby mental events are reduced to their underlying neural substrates, whereas philosophical theories allow multiple ontological or explanatory levels. Notable exceptions exist within both fields (e.g. Nobel Prize-winner neuroscientist John Eccles, who developed a form of dualism-interactionism, and philosophers of mind Paul Churchland and Daniel Dennett, who developed models of eliminative reductionism). Conclusion: This review revealed a wide range of theoretical positions, with considerable overlap between the traditional framework of the mind-body problem and the “hard problem” of consciousness, both in neuroscience (“neural correlates of consciousness”) and philosophy (“qualia”).