A Synergy of Institutional Incentives and Networked Structures in Evolutionary Game Dynamics of Multiagent Systems

Understanding the emergence of prosocial behaviors (e.g., cooperation and trust) among self-interested agents is an important problem in many disciplines. Network structure and institutional incentives (e.g., punishing antisocial agents) are known to promote prosocial behaviors, when acting in isolation, one mechanism being present at a time. Here we study the interplay between these two mechanisms to see whether they are independent, interfering or synergetic. Using evolutionary game theory, we show that punishing antisocial agents and a regular networked structure not only promote prosocial behaviors among agents playing the trust game, but they also interplay with each other, leading to interference or synergy, depending on the game parameters. Synergy emerges on a wider range of parameters than interference does. In this domain, the combination of incentives and networked structure improves the efficiency of incentives, yielding prosocial behaviors at a lower cost than the incentive does alone. This has a significant implication in the promotion of prosocial behaviors in multi-agent systems.