Sentiment, amour, vertu. La morale kantienne dans l’éthique systématique de Hermann Cohen

From his early writings to his later works, Kant constantly reflects on the role that feeling and love play in the domain of morality. His intention is to properly define its status for critical philosophy. Thus, moral feeling plays a prominent role in the practice of virtue. The results leave several possible interpretations open. Cohen follows Kant’s path in an original way. He thinks he can solve the problems that remain open in Kant’s philosophy through the principles of his critical idealism. He introduces the notion of affection, defining it as a cultural-historical fact and characterising it as the instrument that provides the ethical impulse with the necessary con tinuity. Nevertheless, Cohen fails to neutralise the destabilising effect that affect produces in the philosophical architecture he elaborates. As in Kant, this effect produces a resonant interplay between the fields of morality and aesthetics that is rich in philosophical insights.