Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) are nowadays forced to continuously invest in their network infrastructure to keep up with the increasing bandwidth demand and traffic load coming from mobile users. In this context, MNOs have to face the strategic problem of whether to invest on their own or deploy shared networks. We address here the problem of Radio Access Network (RAN) and spectrum sharing in 4G mobile networks. Namely, we consider the case in which multiple MNOs are planning to deploy small cell Base Stations to improve their current network infrastructure; the deployment investment may be shared with other MNOs, thus giving rise to shared RANs. The RAN and spectrum sharing problem is formalized as a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem, where the strategy of each MNO in the game is twofold: selecting a coalition (whom to cooperate) and the fraction of the coalition cost to pay, with the goal of maximizing the individual return on investment. The proposed approach is leveraged to characterize the stable coalitions and their respective cost division policies for various network and economic conditions.

Cano, L., Capone, A., Carello, G., Cesana, M., Passacantando, M. (2016). A Non-cooperative Game Approach for RAN and Spectrum Sharing in Mobile Radio Networks. In European Wireless Conference 2016, EW 2016 (pp.377-382). VDE Verlag.

A Non-cooperative Game Approach for RAN and Spectrum Sharing in Mobile Radio Networks

Passacantando, M
2016

Abstract

Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) are nowadays forced to continuously invest in their network infrastructure to keep up with the increasing bandwidth demand and traffic load coming from mobile users. In this context, MNOs have to face the strategic problem of whether to invest on their own or deploy shared networks. We address here the problem of Radio Access Network (RAN) and spectrum sharing in 4G mobile networks. Namely, we consider the case in which multiple MNOs are planning to deploy small cell Base Stations to improve their current network infrastructure; the deployment investment may be shared with other MNOs, thus giving rise to shared RANs. The RAN and spectrum sharing problem is formalized as a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem, where the strategy of each MNO in the game is twofold: selecting a coalition (whom to cooperate) and the fraction of the coalition cost to pay, with the goal of maximizing the individual return on investment. The proposed approach is leveraged to characterize the stable coalitions and their respective cost division policies for various network and economic conditions.
No
paper
Scientifica
Game theory; Mobile telecommunication systems; Wireless networks; 4G mobile networks; Economic condition; Generalized Nash equilibrium problems; Mobile network operators; Mobile radio networks; Network infrastructure; Noncooperative game; Radio access networks; Investments;
English
22nd European Wireless Conference, EW 2016 - 18 May 2016 through 20 May 2016
978-3-8007-4221-9
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7499326/
Cano, L., Capone, A., Carello, G., Cesana, M., Passacantando, M. (2016). A Non-cooperative Game Approach for RAN and Spectrum Sharing in Mobile Radio Networks. In European Wireless Conference 2016, EW 2016 (pp.377-382). VDE Verlag.
Cano, L; Capone, A; Carello, G; Cesana, M; Passacantando, M
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10281/391561
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