The problem of decisions on the treatment of patients in an irreversible vegetative state is addressed in the essay through a path of analysis in which the reconstruction of Samantha D’Incà’s case is carried out with Eluana Englaro’s case in the background. After recalling the numerous elements that, beyond the differences, the two cases have in common, specific attention is paid to the juridical paths that characterised them and enabled their conclusion, so as to assess whether, in the thirteen years between Eluana’s death and Samantha’s death, progress has been made in the development of criteria and instruments functional to the adoption of end-of-life decisions that respect the wishes of incapacitated subjects and are capable of achieving their “best interests”. From the analysis of the decree of the tutelary judge who played a key role in the D’Incà case, useful elements emerge to support the thesis that, despite the availability of a legislative discipline, the one introduced by Law 219/2017, aimed at strengthening the criteria and instruments already adopted in the Englaro case, the risk of dangerous deviations from the route indicated by the good law on treatment decisions, including those for incapacitated patients, that our country has at its disposal, cannot be considered overcome. !e hope is that any future measures will correct the deviation and find the right course, if we do not want to feed the misleading and dangerous conviction that, after all, the era of paternalism and therapeutic privilege has not yet come to an end and that, consequently, there may be alibis and loopholes for not engaging in that profound change in practices that the law clearly indicates the directions for
Il problema delle decisioni sulle cure destinate a pazienti in irreversibile stato vegetativo è affrontato nel saggio attraverso un percorso di analisi nel quale la ricostru-ione della vicenda di Samantha D’Incà, è realizzata avendo sullo sfondo la vicenda di Eluana Englaro. Dopo aver richiamato i numerosi elementi che, al di là delle differenze, accomunano i due casi, viene rivolta specifica attenzione ai percorsi giuridici che li hanno caratterizzati e che ne hanno consentito la conclusione, così da valutare se, nei tredici anni intercorsi tra la morte di Eluana e la morte di Samantha, si siano compiuti dei passi avanti nella messa a punto di criteri e di strumenti funzionali all’adozione di decisioni di fine vita rispettose delle volontà dei soggetti incapaci e in grado di realizzarne il “miglior interesse”. Dall’analisi del decreto del giudice tutelare, che ha svolto un ruolo chiave nel caso D’Incà, emergono elementi utili a supportare la tesi che, nonostante la disponibilità di una disciplina legislativa, quella introdotta dalla legge 219/2017, volta a rafforzare i criteri e gli strumenti già adottati nel caso Englaro, non si può considerare superato il rischio di pericolose deviazioni dalla rotta indicata dalla buona legge in materia di decisioni sulle cure, anche destinate ai pazienti incapaci, di cui il nostro Paese dispone. L’auspicio è che eventuali provvedimenti futuri correggano le deviazioni e ritrovino la giusta rotta, se non si vuole alimentare la fuorviante e pericolosa convinzione che, dopotutto, l’era del paternalismo e del privilegio terapeutico non sia ancora giunta al tramonto e che, di conseguenza, possano esservi alibi e scappatoie per non impegnarsi in quel profondo mutamento delle prassi di cui pur la legge indica con chiarezza le direzioni.
Borsellino, P. (2021). Il caso Samantha D'Incà. Quali scenari a tredici anni dal caso Englaro?. BIOETICA, XXIX(3), 481-504.
Il caso Samantha D'Incà. Quali scenari a tredici anni dal caso Englaro?
Borsellino, P
2021
Abstract
The problem of decisions on the treatment of patients in an irreversible vegetative state is addressed in the essay through a path of analysis in which the reconstruction of Samantha D’Incà’s case is carried out with Eluana Englaro’s case in the background. After recalling the numerous elements that, beyond the differences, the two cases have in common, specific attention is paid to the juridical paths that characterised them and enabled their conclusion, so as to assess whether, in the thirteen years between Eluana’s death and Samantha’s death, progress has been made in the development of criteria and instruments functional to the adoption of end-of-life decisions that respect the wishes of incapacitated subjects and are capable of achieving their “best interests”. From the analysis of the decree of the tutelary judge who played a key role in the D’Incà case, useful elements emerge to support the thesis that, despite the availability of a legislative discipline, the one introduced by Law 219/2017, aimed at strengthening the criteria and instruments already adopted in the Englaro case, the risk of dangerous deviations from the route indicated by the good law on treatment decisions, including those for incapacitated patients, that our country has at its disposal, cannot be considered overcome. !e hope is that any future measures will correct the deviation and find the right course, if we do not want to feed the misleading and dangerous conviction that, after all, the era of paternalism and therapeutic privilege has not yet come to an end and that, consequently, there may be alibis and loopholes for not engaging in that profound change in practices that the law clearly indicates the directions forI documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.