The quantity-setting (Cournot) oligopoly with perfect complements is dual to the price-setting (Bertrand) oligopoly with homogeneous goods. Under mild technical conditions the former setting has a unique (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium with null quantities. As an implication, the provision of perfectly complementary goods might actually be impossible, if the market is not either perfectly competitive or monopolized.

Bertoletti, P. (2022). The dual of Bertrand with homogenous products is Cournot with perfect complements. ECONOMIC THEORY BULLETIN, 10(2), 183-189 [10.1007/s40505-022-00225-3].

The dual of Bertrand with homogenous products is Cournot with perfect complements

Bertoletti, P
Primo
2022

Abstract

The quantity-setting (Cournot) oligopoly with perfect complements is dual to the price-setting (Bertrand) oligopoly with homogeneous goods. Under mild technical conditions the former setting has a unique (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium with null quantities. As an implication, the provision of perfectly complementary goods might actually be impossible, if the market is not either perfectly competitive or monopolized.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Cournot duopoly; Bertrand duopoly; perfect complements; homogeneous products
English
183
189
7
Precedentemente pubblicato in https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4034282
Bertoletti, P. (2022). The dual of Bertrand with homogenous products is Cournot with perfect complements. ECONOMIC THEORY BULLETIN, 10(2), 183-189 [10.1007/s40505-022-00225-3].
Bertoletti, P
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/371158
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