In Democratic Authority and the Separation of Church and State, Robert Audi addresses disagreements among equally rational persons on political matters of coercion by analysing the features of discussions between epistemic peers, and supporting a normative principle of toleration. It is possible to question the extent to which Audi’s views are consistent with the possibility of religious citizens being properly defined as epistemic peers with their non-religious counterparts, insofar as he also argues for some significant constraints on religious reasons in public debates, and he advocates secular reasons being considered as equivalent to natural reasons. I shall also consider Jürgen Habermas’s criticism of Audi’s stance. One of Habermas’ main points focused on Audi’s strong division between religious and non-religious arguments that requires religious citizens to artificially split their reasons, while non-religiously affiliated citizens are not met with any similar requirement. Also, analysing the concept of epistemic parity, we can as well grasp some of the main features of the Habermasian idea of postsecularism. The difference between secular and postsecular views can be framed as hinging on what it means to be epistemic peers, thus bearing consequences on the understanding of the relationship between church and state—particularly regarding the nature of state neutrality and the different status of churches and organised secular groups.

In Democratic Authority and the Separation of Church and State, Robert Audi considera il problema del disaccordo fra persone ugualmente razionali su questioni politiche in materia di coercizione, analizzando le caratteristiche delle discussioni fra persone epistemicamente pari, e sostenendo un principio normativo di tolleranza. Si può tuttavia mettere in questione se la prospettiva di Audi sia coerente con la possibilità per i cittadini religiosi di essere propriamente definiti come epistemicamente pari alle loro controparti non religiose, nella misura in cui egli supporta l'imposizione di significativi limiti all'uso di ragioni religiose nei dibattiti pubblici, ed equipara le ragioni secolari a ragioni naturali. Considererò inoltre la critica rivolta da Jürgen Habermas alla posizione di Audi. Uno degli argomenti principali di Habermas è la forte divisione operata da Audi fra argomenti religiosi e non religiosi; tale divisione richiede ai cittadini di separare artificialmente le loro ragioni, mentre nessuna richiesta simile è rivolta ai cittadini senza affiliazioni religiose. Inoltre, analizzando il concetto di parità epistemica, possiamo anche cogliere alcune delle caratteristiche principali dell'idea habermasiana di postsecolarismo. La differenza fra prospettive secolari e postsecolari può essere vista come dipendente dalla nostra visione di che cosa significa essere epistemicamente pari, con un insieme di conseguenze sulla comprensione della relazione fra chiesa e stato - in particolare riguardo alla natura della neutralità dello stato e il differente status delle chiese e dei gruppi organizzati di natura secolare.

Monti, P. (2013). A Postsecular Rationale? Religious and Secular as Epistemic Peers. FILOSOFIA E QUESTIONI PUBBLICHE, 3(2), 201-240.

A Postsecular Rationale? Religious and Secular as Epistemic Peers

Monti, Paolo
2013

Abstract

In Democratic Authority and the Separation of Church and State, Robert Audi addresses disagreements among equally rational persons on political matters of coercion by analysing the features of discussions between epistemic peers, and supporting a normative principle of toleration. It is possible to question the extent to which Audi’s views are consistent with the possibility of religious citizens being properly defined as epistemic peers with their non-religious counterparts, insofar as he also argues for some significant constraints on religious reasons in public debates, and he advocates secular reasons being considered as equivalent to natural reasons. I shall also consider Jürgen Habermas’s criticism of Audi’s stance. One of Habermas’ main points focused on Audi’s strong division between religious and non-religious arguments that requires religious citizens to artificially split their reasons, while non-religiously affiliated citizens are not met with any similar requirement. Also, analysing the concept of epistemic parity, we can as well grasp some of the main features of the Habermasian idea of postsecularism. The difference between secular and postsecular views can be framed as hinging on what it means to be epistemic peers, thus bearing consequences on the understanding of the relationship between church and state—particularly regarding the nature of state neutrality and the different status of churches and organised secular groups.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Robert Audi; Jürgen Habermas; Postsecularism; Religion and Politics; Public ethics; Ethics of citizenship;
Robert Audi; Jürgen Habermas; Postsecolarismo; Religione and Politica; Etica Pubblica; Etica della Cittadinanza;
English
2013
3
2
201
240
reserved
Monti, P. (2013). A Postsecular Rationale? Religious and Secular as Epistemic Peers. FILOSOFIA E QUESTIONI PUBBLICHE, 3(2), 201-240.
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
10_Monti_A-Postsecular-Rationale-Religious-and-Secular-as-Epistemic-Peers_PPI_vol3_n2_2013.pdf

Solo gestori archivio

Dimensione 974.46 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
974.46 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/364314
Citazioni
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
Social impact