We analyze the role of fiscal-monetary policy interactions and fiscal coordination in EMU under the assumption of strategic wage setting in unionized labour markets. We find that production subsidies and real wage distortions are strategic complements. The literature on macroeconomic stabilisation policies and policy games usually neglects this point and reaches overoptimistic conclusions about the desirable effects of accommodating fiscal policies. Central bank preferences also affect the desirability of fiscal coordination in a monetary union. In fact, contrary to Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998), we find that fiscal coordination improves outcomes in the case of a conservative central banker, whereas it leads to worse outcomes with a populist one.
Acocella, N., Di Bartolomeo, G., & Tirelli, P. (2007). Fiscal Leadership and Coordination in a monetary union. OPEN ECONOMIES REVIEW, 18(3), 281-289.
Citazione: | Acocella, N., Di Bartolomeo, G., & Tirelli, P. (2007). Fiscal Leadership and Coordination in a monetary union. OPEN ECONOMIES REVIEW, 18(3), 281-289. |
Tipo: | Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico |
Carattere della pubblicazione: | Scientifica |
Titolo: | Fiscal Leadership and Coordination in a monetary union |
Autori: | Acocella, N; Di Bartolomeo, G; Tirelli, P |
Autori: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | lug-2007 |
Lingua: | English |
Rivista: | OPEN ECONOMIES REVIEW |
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11079-007-9038-4 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 01 - Articolo su rivista |