In monetary unions time-inconsistency provides the rationale for monetary conservativeness and against fiscal coordination. However, this depends on the assumption of exogenous labor markets. Once wage-setting behavior is explicitly modeled, fiscal coordination and less conservative central bankers improve the performance.

Acocella, N., Di, B., & Tirelli, P. (2007). Monetary conservatism and fiscal coordination in a monetary union. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 94(1), 56-63 [10.1016/j.econlet.2006.08.002].

Monetary conservatism and fiscal coordination in a monetary union

TIRELLI, PATRIZIO
2007-01

Abstract

In monetary unions time-inconsistency provides the rationale for monetary conservativeness and against fiscal coordination. However, this depends on the assumption of exogenous labor markets. Once wage-setting behavior is explicitly modeled, fiscal coordination and less conservative central bankers improve the performance.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Scientifica
Monetary policy; Fiscal policy coordination; Labor unions; Monetary union
English
56
63
Acocella, N., Di, B., & Tirelli, P. (2007). Monetary conservatism and fiscal coordination in a monetary union. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 94(1), 56-63 [10.1016/j.econlet.2006.08.002].
Acocella, N; Di, B; Tirelli, P
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10281/3368
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