In this paper we focus on some new normativist positions and compare them with traditional ones. In so doing, we claim that if normative judgments are involved in determining whether a condition is a disease only in the sense identified by new normativisms, then disease is normative only in a weak sense, which must be distinguished from the strong sense advocated by traditional normativisms. Specifically, we argue that weak and strong normativity are different to the point that one ‘normativist’ label ceases to be appropriate for the whole range of positions. If values and norms are not explicit components of the concept of disease, but only intervene in other explanatory roles, then the concept of disease is no more value-laden than many other scientific concepts, or even any other scientific concept. We call the newly identified position “value-conscious naturalism” about disease, and point to some of its theoretical and practical advantages.

Amoretti, M., Lalumera, E. (2022). Wherein is the concept of disease normative? From weak normativity to value-conscious naturalism. MEDICINE, HEALTH CARE AND PHILOSOPHY, 25(1), 47-60 [10.1007/s11019-021-10048-x].

Wherein is the concept of disease normative? From weak normativity to value-conscious naturalism

Lalumera, Elisabetta
Co-primo
2022

Abstract

In this paper we focus on some new normativist positions and compare them with traditional ones. In so doing, we claim that if normative judgments are involved in determining whether a condition is a disease only in the sense identified by new normativisms, then disease is normative only in a weak sense, which must be distinguished from the strong sense advocated by traditional normativisms. Specifically, we argue that weak and strong normativity are different to the point that one ‘normativist’ label ceases to be appropriate for the whole range of positions. If values and norms are not explicit components of the concept of disease, but only intervene in other explanatory roles, then the concept of disease is no more value-laden than many other scientific concepts, or even any other scientific concept. We call the newly identified position “value-conscious naturalism” about disease, and point to some of its theoretical and practical advantages.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Disease; Harm; Naturalism; Non-epistemic values; Normativism; Value-ladenness;
English
30-ago-2021
2022
25
1
47
60
open
Amoretti, M., Lalumera, E. (2022). Wherein is the concept of disease normative? From weak normativity to value-conscious naturalism. MEDICINE, HEALTH CARE AND PHILOSOPHY, 25(1), 47-60 [10.1007/s11019-021-10048-x].
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Amoretti-Lalumera2021_WhereinIsTheConceptOfDiseaseNo.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia di allegato: Publisher’s Version (Version of Record, VoR)
Dimensione 631.5 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
631.5 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/324706
Citazioni
  • Scopus 6
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 7
Social impact