We propose a model in which money performs an essential role in the process of exchange, despite the presence of a multilateral clearing house that collects resources from and distributes them to anonymous agents. Money improves the functioning of the clearing house, simultaneously keeping the incentives to contribute and guaranteeing the fine-tuning of allocations.
Amendola, N., Ferraris, L. (2020). Money and Limited Enforcement in Multilateral Exchange. MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS, 24(5 (July 2020)), 1222-1239 [10.1017/S1365100518000822].
Money and Limited Enforcement in Multilateral Exchange
Ferraris, L
2020
Abstract
We propose a model in which money performs an essential role in the process of exchange, despite the presence of a multilateral clearing house that collects resources from and distributes them to anonymous agents. Money improves the functioning of the clearing house, simultaneously keeping the incentives to contribute and guaranteeing the fine-tuning of allocations.
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
