The survey is concerned with the issue of information transmission from experts to nonexperts. Two main approaches to the use of experts can be traced. According to the game-theoretic approach expertise is a case of asymmetric information between the expert, who is the better informed agent, and the non-expert, who is either a decisionmaker or an evaluator of the expert’s performance. According to the Bayesian decisiontheoretic approach the expert is the agent who announces his probabilistic opinion, and the non-expert has to incorporate that opinion into his beliefs in a consistent way, despite his poor understanding of the expert’s substantive knowledge. The two approaches ground the relationships between experts and non-experts on such different premises that their results are very poorly connected.

Valsecchi, I. (2008). Learning from Experts. FEEM WORKING PAPERS, 35.2008, 1-24.

Learning from Experts

VALSECCHI, IRENE ARMIDA
2008

Abstract

The survey is concerned with the issue of information transmission from experts to nonexperts. Two main approaches to the use of experts can be traced. According to the game-theoretic approach expertise is a case of asymmetric information between the expert, who is the better informed agent, and the non-expert, who is either a decisionmaker or an evaluator of the expert’s performance. According to the Bayesian decisiontheoretic approach the expert is the agent who announces his probabilistic opinion, and the non-expert has to incorporate that opinion into his beliefs in a consistent way, despite his poor understanding of the expert’s substantive knowledge. The two approaches ground the relationships between experts and non-experts on such different premises that their results are very poorly connected.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
Expert, Information Transmission, Learning
English
2008
35.2008
1
24
none
Valsecchi, I. (2008). Learning from Experts. FEEM WORKING PAPERS, 35.2008, 1-24.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/28798
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