Tariff discrimination by a regulated monopolist is sometimes politically unfeasible on distributional grounds. However, under a simple regulatory constraint, discriminatory two-part tariffs provide a Pareto improvement. This suggests an implementable reform of the uniform tariff used in some public utilities.
Bertoletti, P., Poletti, C. (1997). Welfare effects of discriminatory two-part tariffs constrained by price caps. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 56(3), 293-298 [10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00190-0].
Welfare effects of discriminatory two-part tariffs constrained by price caps
BERTOLETTI, PAOLO
;POLETTI, CRISTIAN
1997
Abstract
Tariff discrimination by a regulated monopolist is sometimes politically unfeasible on distributional grounds. However, under a simple regulatory constraint, discriminatory two-part tariffs provide a Pareto improvement. This suggests an implementable reform of the uniform tariff used in some public utilities.
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
