This paper reconsiders a model proposed by De Fraja (1993) to compare public and private production under complete and incomplete information. It is argued, in contrast to previous results, that such a model provides no convincing grounds to sustain the productive superiority of public ownership. It is also suggested that meaningful comparisons of efficiency require settings where differences in ownership imply different implementation constraints

Bertoletti, P. (2001). On endogenous efficiency in public and private firms. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, 3(3), 273-284 [10.1111/1097-3923.00067].

On endogenous efficiency in public and private firms

Bertoletti, P
2001

Abstract

This paper reconsiders a model proposed by De Fraja (1993) to compare public and private production under complete and incomplete information. It is argued, in contrast to previous results, that such a model provides no convincing grounds to sustain the productive superiority of public ownership. It is also suggested that meaningful comparisons of efficiency require settings where differences in ownership imply different implementation constraints
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
endogenous efficiency; public production; ownership; asymmetric information
English
2001
3
3
273
284
none
Bertoletti, P. (2001). On endogenous efficiency in public and private firms. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, 3(3), 273-284 [10.1111/1097-3923.00067].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10281/244408
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