This chapter focuses on a recent revival of conceptual analysis, the philosophical method of discovering necessary and a priori contents by describing conceptual relations. According to some philosophers, contents such as 'Red is a color' are true in virtue of the deep structure of our cognitive system, and assuming that this structure is innate, they are true independently of experience, i.e., they are a priori. I defend an alternative position, according to which relations among concepts, whether innate or acquired, mirror the relations among the real-world properties they refer to, and our conceptual structure is continuously tested and compared with the characteristics of our environment. In such a view, if a description of our conceptual equipment generates true content, those are a posteriori ones.
Lalumera, E. (2005). Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. In H. Cohen & C. Lefebvre (eds.), Handbook of Categorization in Cognitive Science (pp. 1055-1072). Paris-Amsterdam : Elsevier.
Citazione: | Lalumera, E. (2005). Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. In H. Cohen & C. Lefebvre (eds.), Handbook of Categorization in Cognitive Science (pp. 1055-1072). Paris-Amsterdam : Elsevier. |
Titolo: | Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism |
Autori: | Lalumera, E |
Autori: | |
Tipo: | Capitolo o saggio |
Carattere della pubblicazione: | Scientifica |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2005 |
Lingua: | English |
Titolo del libro: | H. Cohen & C. Lefebvre (eds.), Handbook of Categorization in Cognitive Science |
ISBN: | 978-0-08-044612-7 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 03 - Contributo in libro |