After a brief survey of the literature about the existence of a Nash Equilibrium in the class of the nonatomic games, we prove the existence of an equilibrium in the class of the nonatomic games where the players' payoff depends over the average strategy of finitely many convex and disjoint subsets of players. Finally, several applications are shown, in the context of the economics of science and namely about the problem of the topic choice made by the set of the researchers, represented as a continuum.
Rocco, L. (2001). Nonatomic Games with Limited Anonymity [Working paper del dipartimento].
Nonatomic Games with Limited Anonymity
ROCCO, LORENZO
2001
Abstract
After a brief survey of the literature about the existence of a Nash Equilibrium in the class of the nonatomic games, we prove the existence of an equilibrium in the class of the nonatomic games where the players' payoff depends over the average strategy of finitely many convex and disjoint subsets of players. Finally, several applications are shown, in the context of the economics of science and namely about the problem of the topic choice made by the set of the researchers, represented as a continuum.File in questo prodotto:
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