I argue that a concept is applied correctly when it is applied to the kind of things it is the concept of. Correctness as successful kind-tracking is fulfilling an externally and naturalistically individuated standard. And the normative aspect of concept-application so characterized depends on the relational (non-individualistic) feature of conceptual content. I defend this view against two objections. The first is that norms should provide justifications for action, and the second involves a version of the thesis of indeterminacy of reference.

Lalumera, E. (2005). A Simple Realist Account of the Normativity of Concepts. DISPUTATIO, 1(19), 1-17.

A Simple Realist Account of the Normativity of Concepts

LALUMERA, ELISABETTA
2005

Abstract

I argue that a concept is applied correctly when it is applied to the kind of things it is the concept of. Correctness as successful kind-tracking is fulfilling an externally and naturalistically individuated standard. And the normative aspect of concept-application so characterized depends on the relational (non-individualistic) feature of conceptual content. I defend this view against two objections. The first is that norms should provide justifications for action, and the second involves a version of the thesis of indeterminacy of reference.
Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico
concepts, philosophy, normativity
English
Disputatio is covered by the following abstracting and indexing services: Latindex The Philosopher's Index Directory of Open Access Journals PhilPapers EBCSHOST
Lalumera, E. (2005). A Simple Realist Account of the Normativity of Concepts. DISPUTATIO, 1(19), 1-17.
Lalumera, E
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10281/1909
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