I argue that a concept is applied correctly when it is applied to the kind of things it is the concept of. Correctness as successful kind-tracking is fulfilling an externally and naturalistically individuated standard. And the normative aspect of concept-application so characterized depends on the relational (non-individualistic) feature of conceptual content. I defend this view against two objections. The first is that norms should provide justifications for action, and the second involves a version of the thesis of indeterminacy of reference.
Lalumera, E. (2005). A Simple Realist Account of the Normativity of Concepts. DISPUTATIO, 1(19), 1-17.
Citazione: | Lalumera, E. (2005). A Simple Realist Account of the Normativity of Concepts. DISPUTATIO, 1(19), 1-17. | |
Tipo: | Articolo in rivista - Articolo scientifico | |
Carattere della pubblicazione: | Scientifica | |
Titolo: | A Simple Realist Account of the Normativity of Concepts | |
Autori: | Lalumera, E | |
Autori: | ||
Data di pubblicazione: | 2005 | |
Lingua: | English | |
Rivista: | DISPUTATIO | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 01 - Articolo su rivista |